



Approved For Release 2007/02/07 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000200060005-5

Department of State

TELEGRAM

74328

SECRET 870

CABLE SECRETARIAT ROUTING: EXDIS, BACKGROUND USE ONLY: FILE, CS/RF, DCI,

~~DDI~~ DDP, SDO, D/OCI, D/NIC, D/ONE, C/FE, D/OER, SAVA, 25X1

EX/DIR, ADDP, D/ICS, 029

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

091168

O R 180630Z MAR 72 ZFF-1
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7381
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY SAIGON
AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
CINCPAC

*circulate to
file LHM
B*

SECRET VIENTIANE 2172

EXDIS

SUBJECT: DECLASSIFICATION OF MOOSE/LOWENSTEIN REPORT

REF: STATE 045007

1. I SHALL BE RESPONDING SEPARATELY IN AN OVERALL MANNER TO REFTEL. I WISH, HOWEVER, TO COMMENT AT THIS TIME ON PARA 2M REGARDING THE LAO REQUEST FOR THAI AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE REGULARS LAST SUMMER. I DO NOT KNOW WHAT MOOSE/LOWENSTEIN REPORT CONTAINS ON THIS SUBJECT BUT I AM MOST SENSITIVE TO THE LAO REQUEST FOR SOUTH VIETNAMESE ASSISTANCE. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS SOUVANNA HAS SENT REPRESENTATIVES TO SOUTH VIETNAM TO SEEK SOUTH VIETNAMESE ASSISTANCE IN THE ATTŌPEU/SARAVANE AREAS. THESE DEMARCHES HAVE GONE FROM HOPED FOR BATTALION-LEVEL INCURSIONS UP TO A RENEWED LAMSON 719. SOUVANNA HAS ALWAYS CONSIDERED THESE DEMARCHES AS MOST SENSITIVE ACTIONS ON HIS PART, FOR IF THEY WERE MADE PUBLIC THAT WOULD DESTROY HIS NEUTRAL FACADE. CERTAIN OFFICERS IN THE DEPARTMENT WILL RECALL HIS ATTITUDE RE LAMSON 719 AND HE HAS ALWAYS CITED THE FACT THAT HE DID NOT WELCOME ARVN INVADING LAOS. HE HAS BEEN WALKING A TIGHTROPE ON THIS ISSUE AND WERE IT EVER TO BE MADE PUBLIC, PARTICULARLY IN AN OFFICIAL DOCUMENT OF THE UNITED STATES LEGISLATIVE BRANCH, IT WOULD BE DEEPLY RESENTED BY THE PRIME MINISTER.

State Dept. review completed

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2. I CANNOT RECALL SPECIFICALLY DISCUSSING SOUVANNA'S ACTION WITH MOOSE/LOWENSTEIN. IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE, HOWEVER, THAT I DID SO BUT IN SO DOING I AM CERTAIN THAT I WOULD HAVE INDICATED THE SENSITIVITY OF SOUVANNA'S ACTION AND I WOULD HAVE TOLD MOOSE/LOWENSTEIN THAT IN MAKING THIS INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE I WAS DOING SO ON A TOP SECRET BASIS.

3. I DO NOT BELIEVE IT IS WISE FOR ME TO APPROACH SOUVANNA ON THIS SUBJECT. I KNOW FULL WELL THAT HE WILL TELL ME THAT THE INFORMATION HE OR HIS ASSOCIATES MADE AVAILABLE TO ME, WAS CONSIDERED TO BE TOP SECRET AND THAT I ACCEPTED IT ON THAT BASIS. THE FACT THAT I MADE IT AVAILABLE TO THE STAFF MEMBERS OF THE SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE WOULD BE CONSIDERED BY SOUVANNA AS A GROSS BREACH OF CONFIDENCE ON MY PART. IF IN TURN THE SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT CONTAINS THIS INFORMATION I WILL CONSIDER IT TO BE A GROSS BREACH OF CONFIDENCE BY SENATOR SYMINGTON. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT I AM OVERSTATING THE CASE THAT IF THE MOOSE/LOWENSTEIN REPORT CONTAINS ANY REFERENCE TO THE RLG SEEKING ASSISTANCE OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY FORCES IN LAOS, IT WOULD DESTROY ANY CONFIDENCE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD HAVE IN ME PERSONALLY. THE SUCCEEDING AMBASSADOR WOULD HAVE A HARD ROW TO HOE.
GP-1.
GODLEY

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